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Abstract
Recently, Liaw et al. proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smart
cards. Their scheme has claimed a number of features e.g. mutual authentication, no
clock synchronization, no verifier table, flexible user password change, etc. We show
that Liaw et al.’s scheme is completely insecure. By intercepting a valid login message
in Liaw et al.’s scheme, any unregistered user or adversary can easily login to the
remote system and establish a session key.
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1 Introduction
Remote system authentication is a process by which a remote system gains confidence about
the identity (or login request) of the communicating partner. Since the Lamport’s scheme
[1], several remote user authentication schemes and improvements have been proposed with
and without smart cards. Recently, Liaw et al. [2] proposed a remote user authentication
scheme using smart cards. Their scheme has claimed a number of features e.g. mutual
authentication, no clock synchronization, no verifier table, flexible user password change,
etc. We show that Liaw et al.’s scheme is completely insecure. Any unregistered user can
easily login to the remote system and establish a session key.
2 The Liaw et al.’s scheme
The scheme consists of five phases: registration, login, verification, session and password
change.
Registration phase: A new user Ui submits identity IDi and password PWi to the remote
system for registration. The remote system computes Ui’s secret information vi = h(IDi, x)
and ei = vi ⊕ PWi, where x is a secret key maintained by the remote system and h(·) is a
secure one-way hash function. Then the remote system writes h(·) and ei into the memory
of a smart card and issues the card to Ui.
Login phase: When Ui wants to log into the remote system, he/she inserts the smart card
into the terminal and enters IDi and PWi. The smart card then performs the following
operations:
1
L1. Generate a random nonce Ni and compute Ci = h(ei ⊕ PWi, Ni).
L2. Send the login message < IDi, Ci, Ni > to the remote system.
Verification phase: To check the authenticity of < IDi, Ci, Ni >, the remote system
checks the validity of IDi. If IDi is valid, computes v
′
i
= h(IDi, x) and checks whether
Ci = h(v
′
i
, Ni). Then generates a random nonce Ns, encrypts the messageM = Ev′
i
(Ni, Ns)
and sends it back to the card.
The smart card decrypts the messageDei⊕PWi(M) and gets (N
′
i
, N ′s). Then verifies whether
N ′
i
= Ni and N
′
s = Ns
1. If these checks hold valid, the mutual authentication is done.
Session phase: This phase involves two public parameters q and α where q is a large prime
number and α is a primitive element mod q. The phase works as follows:
S1. The remote system computes Si = α
Ns mod q and sends Si to the smart card. The
smart card computes Wi = α
Ni mod q and sends Wi to the remote system.
S2. The remote system computes Ks = (Wi)
Ns mod q and, the smart card computes
Ku = (Si)
Ni mod q. It is easy to see that Ks = Ku. Then, the card and the remote
system exchange the data using the session key and ei.
Password change phase: With this phase Ui can change his/her PWi by the following
steps:
S1. Calculate e′
i
= ei ⊕ PWi ⊕ PW
′
i
.
S2. Update ei on the memory of smart card to set e
′
i
.
3 Security Weaknesses
Weakness of Authentication phase: The authentication phase suffers from the replay at-
tacks. The authenticity of the login request is not checked at all. The adversary A (or
any unregistered user) intercepts a valid login request, say < IDi, Ci, Ni >. Later A sends
< IDi, Ci, Ni > to the remote system, as a login request . To validate < IDi, Ci, Ni >, the
remote system does the following:
1. Check the validity of IDi. This holds true, because the adversary sends IDi, inter-
cepted from a valid login request.
2. Compute v′
i
= h(IDi, x) and check whether Ci = h(v
′
i
, Ni). This check also passes
successfully, because there is no record at the server side whether Ni was used in
some previous login message. Therefore the server is unable to detect whether the
Ci is coming from a legitimate user or from an adversary. Now we see the security
strength of the mutual authentication.
3. The remote system generates a nonceN∗s and encrypts the messageM = Ev′
i
(Ni, N
∗
s ),
then sends < M > back to the communicating party (assumes logged in entity is a
legitimate user).
1
It is noted that the verification of N
′
s = Ns cannot be examined because the smart card does not have
information about Ns
2
4. A will not do anything, simply sends a valid signal by saying that the server au-
thenticity is done and then, A gains the access to the remote system. Therefore,
ultimately there is no user or server authenticity checks at all.
Weakness of Session phase: Although Liaw et al.’s scheme used Diffie-Hellman [3] key
exchange protocol for session key establishment; however, they did not consider the risk of
Diffie-Hellman’s protocol (i.e., man-in-the-middle attack) while establishing the user and
server common session key. Let us examine the weakness of the session phase.
1. The remote system computes Si = α
N
∗
s mod q and sends Si to the communicating
party. A (who already passes the authentication phase and gains the access to the
remote system) computes Wi = α
Ni mod q and sends Wi to the remote system.
2. The remote system computes Ks = (Wi)
N∗
s mod q and A computes Ka = (Si)
Ni mod
q. It is easy to see that Ks = Ka.
In fact, all the parameters Ni, Si,Wi, α, q are public, thereby any one can compute the ses-
sion key. Once the session key is established then the remote system and A exchange data
in an encrypted manner, where ei acts as the encryption key. Firstly, the remote system
does not know ei. Secondly, the session key never serve the purpose of the transaction
privacy, instead it is just xor-ed with the message and ei is used for transaction privacy,
which is not the actual scenario in the practical applications.
Weakness of Password change phase: There is no verification of the entered password.
This effectively makes the smart card useless. Suppose Ui enters his password which
is actually misspelled or incorrect, that is, instead of PWi he/she enters PW . How-
ever, the smart card takes the wrong password PW and asks for a new password. Now,
Ui enters new password PW
′
i
. The smart card updates old ei by the new e
′
i
where
e′
i
= ei ⊕ PW ⊕ PW
′
i
= h(IDi, x) ⊕ PWi ⊕ PW ⊕ PW
′
i
. In the next login time, Ui
cannot login to the remote system, because the verification of Ci fails. In another scenario,
if Ui’s smart card is lost or stolen, then the party who got the smart card, would try to login
and enters some random password, which leads to block the card, as there is no provision
of checking the entered password.
4 Conclusion
We have shown the security weaknesses of the Liaw et al.’s scheme. The design of the Liaw
et al.’s scheme is so weak that any one can login to the remote system by just intercepting
a valid login message.
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